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Introduction
For purposes of this paper, the term "mission control" will be taken
quite broadly to include both ground- and space-based operations as well as
the information infrastructure necessary to support such operations. The
paper will focus on three major technology areas related to advanced mission
control. These are:
Intelligent Assistance for Ground.Based Mission
Controllers and Space-Based Crew: computational systems
that increase human performance and reduce training time--this
area will be referred to as IA for the remainder of the paper
Autonomous Onboard Monitoring, Control and FDIR:
computational systems that are independently able to montor,
control, diagnose, and repair onboard systems when humans are
unavailable or incapable of performing under the applicable
realtime constraints--to be referred to as A O M
Dynamic Corporate Memory Acquired, Maintained, and
Utilized During the Entire Vehicle Life-Cycle: methods
for acquiring, storing, preserving, and utilizing knowledge of
many forms that is gained during design, construction, testing,
and operations of a vehicle and provides an important basis for
effective mission control--to be referred to as C M.
While only the first area falls within the traditional purview of mission
control, all three contribute substantially to a truly efficient total system for
operations of the Agency's next generations of space vehicles.
The paper will survey the current state-of-the-art both within NASA
and externally for each of the three technology areas and will discuss major
objectives from a user point-of-view for technology development. Ongoing
NASA and other-governmental programs will be described (including
approximate dates of readiness for operational Agency use) along with key
contacts and facilities (both existing and planned). An analysis of major
research issues and current "holes" in the program will be provided. Finally,
the paper will present several recommendations for enhancing the
technology development and insertion process to create advanced mission
control environments.
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Current State-of-the-Art
Within the I A area, NASA is considerably behind the industrial state-of-
the-art. This is an area that has seen enormous advances both in hardware
(moving from main frame driven alphanumeric displays to powerful
individual workstation utilizing bit-mapped graphic displays) and software
(with thousands of fielded knowledge-based systems and recent developments
in hypercard and related technologies). While the Agency has several
ongoing efforts to update information management for human mission
controllers (some are described below), it still uses technology that has not
advanced significantly since the 1960's in many cases. The contrast to
industrial practice is seen best by comparison to off-the-shelf systems being
produced by companies like Measurex to provide "mission control" to highly
automated factories. The key point here is that, in this author's opinion,
within the ground-based IA area there is little need for NASA to lead in
developing new technology, but instead should concentrate on upgrading to
the very best of current industrial standards.
For space-based systems there is little industrial or governmental
precedent (mainly because we have only modest amounts of space-based
"mission control" at the present). For crew on STS, complex procedure
manuals and the radio link to help on the ground serve as their major
information sources. Perhaps the best known work to improve the state-of-
the-art here is the Pilot's Associate Project sponsored by DARPA and the Air
Force. Several projects to build intelligent assistants for crew are described
below; NASA should clearly lead in this area, particularly as it moves to human
exploration missions where the link to the ground is far more tenuous than it
is today.
Within the AOM area, both NASA and outside industry rely mainly on
conventional algorithmic methods for monitoring and control with few, if
any, operationally fielded autonomous systems capable of complex diagnosis
and repair (even if solely by reconfiguration). The "conventional" systems
can be quite complex (e.g. the systems that control STS ascent), but are poor at
reacting to unpredicted events outside of a narrow mission envelope.
Considerable basic research has been accomplished over the last ten to fifteen
years to improve this situation. The growth of work in "model-based
reasoning" within the artificial intelligence field is an attempt to expand from
experience-based heuristic methods (commonly known as expert systems) to
systems that are capable of reasoning from first principles of science and
engineering to accomplish control and diagnosis in real time. NASA is
currently among the leaders in work in this field (see below) and should
continue its efforts with increased emphasis on technology insertion projects
as the basic work matures.
The CM area is viewed by many in the computer science community as
one of the next great challenges to the field. The goal here is to expand upon
current data base and knowledge base technology to allow for the automatic
creation of information systems several orders of magnitude beyond those in
current use. A current example of a NASA information system is the Space
Station Freedom Technical and Management Information System (TMIS).
Ideally TMIS would encapsulate all of the design, construction, testing, and
operations knowledge (both formal and anecdotal) from dozens of contractors
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and thousandsof engineersin a form that is maintainable and useable (both
by humans and by automated systems) for the thirty-plus year life span of SSF.
Practically TMIS will be a massive document indexing and retrieval system
utilizing mainly current data base technology. This does represent the state-
of-the-an in the field. Efforts (some described below) arc underway to
improve those conditions, but NASA, because of its nearly uniquely complex
and long-lasting information requirements, is in the ideal position to lead new
initiatives to improve the state-of-the-art in this area.
Objectives
Each of the three technology areas has several objectives that relate to
improving mission control environments within NASA. For the IA area the
major objectives are:
Reduced manpower needs: current STS operations require
over 400 support personnel in the FCR and back rooms. Round-
the-clock SSF operations over thirty-plus years will impose a
manpower problem (and therefore a cost problem) of massive
proportions unless technological improvements make a
substantial contribution. The objective here is to automate as
many of the back room functions as possible as those personnel
serve mainly in information gathering roles for FCR officers
who make critical decisions.
Reduced training time: current systems require two years or
more of extensive training to turn a novice controller into
an expert. Much of that time is needed to explain abstruse
displays and terminology to engineers already versed in actual
vehicle structure and functions. Systems that can deal with
trained engineers in closer to the normal language of
engineering (schematic diagrams, technical English, etc.)
already show strong potential for major reduction of the
training period.
Improved critical decision-making: current systems
present too much information at a single cognitive level during
periods of critical, time-limited, decision-making. Intelligent
assistants that can highlight and focus attention will provide
substantial improvement in human performance (in essence this
is the major theme of the DARPA/Air Force Pilot's Associate
Project--allow the crew to focus on the crisis at hand).
For the AOM area the major objectives are:
Free crew to conduct mission tasks: if automated systems
can be built to monitor and control routine onboard subsystem
operations (e.g. power, thermal, communications) and to find and
in some cases even correct failures, then crew can be freed to
conduct the real business of reactive space science and
exploration. This will greatly enhance the effective return of
major Agency missions. As an interesting note, an informal, but
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substantialsurvey of crew done for the SSF Level I Study on
Advanced Automation showed that crew were overwhelmingly
in favor of automated systems that would allow them to become
productive scientists and engineers rather than "on-off switch
flippers" for Space Station Freedom missions.
Provide reaitime capabilities beyond human
performance levels: for many subsystems, humans simply
cannot react fast enough for major classes of control and fault-
correction situations. Any enhanced capabilities beyond those
currently available from algorithmic control will contribute
substantially to crew safety and mission performance.
Enhanced mission safety by discovery of incipient
failures: humans arc notoriously poor at tracking thousands of
engineering parameters over dozens or hundreds of days. Some
onboard problems occur with little warning, but, in theory, many
could be found in the anomaly, as opposed to failure, stage by
diligent, autonomous analysis of all telemetry data, carefully
looking for trends that may lead to failure.
For the CM area the major objectives are:
Capture, represent, and maintain knowledge
throughout design, construction, test, and operations:
ideally a corporate memory system would acquire knowledge
routinely throughout a vehicle's entire life cycle. It is important
to note that the oft-repeated Agency goal of "Design Knowledge
Capture" tends to obscure the fact that design knowledge is only
part of the information that can lead to efficient operations since
enormous amounts of practical information are gained later in
the life cycle, and that knowledge capture is only part of
making information useful (after all, the tens of thousands of
pages of engineering documents "capture" knowicdgc, they
just do not make it practically available to problem-solvers).
Automatically provide focused problem-solving
capability: a long-term objective is to provide the ability to
automatically "compile" specific problem-solving systems from a
generic corporate memory. This would allow the same
information to be used effectively in several different problem-
solving contexts, e.g. diagnosis and re-design without the current
process of expensive "hand-crafting" of knowledge-based
systems. While it is unlikely that this objective will be met
within the short-term, basic research results sponsored by
NASA have already shown the concept to be viable.
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Ongoing Activities
Three NASA programs are conducting research and development
activities in the technology areas described above. In OAST, the CSTI Artificial
Intelligence Program (run by Code RC, the Information Sciences and Human
Factors Division) is responsible for basic scientific research, applied
engineering development, and significant amounts of applications
prototyping in all three areas. In fact, the I A, A OM, and CM areas make up
about 75% of the entire Program, and much of the remaining portions of the
Program deal with engineering telemetry analysis, of clear peripheral
relevance to the three areas discussed here. Basic research in planning,
scheduling, knowledge acquisition, cooperating intelligent systems, machine
learning, and large-scale knowledge base technology is conducted at ARC and
its associated grantees and contractors, and at JPL. Engineering development
of tools for scheduling, modeling and simulation of complex Agency devices,
integration of symbolic and numeric control methods, and man-machine
interaction is conducted at ARC, JPL, JSC, and MSFC. Prototype and fielded
applications for existing mission control environments (e.g. MCC at JSC, Firing
Room at KSC, POCC at MSFC, and Planetary mission controls at JPL) and planned
future environments (e.g. SSCC and major onboard subsystems for SSF) are
being built at all NASA Centers except LaRC and SSC. Total spending in these
areas in FY 1990 will be approximately $10.5M.
Code MD runs the Advanced Operations Program which supports studies
and protoype applications construction at JSC and KSC. The JSC work includes
advanced graphics, simulation tools, and command processing languages for
MCC, intelligent computer assisted training (ICAT), and autonomous methods
for such applications as ascent guidance and onboard system management.
The KSC work includes automated planning and scheduling tools, launch
decision support systems, ICAT, operations analysis, and natural language
interfaces. Total spending in these areas in FY 1990 will be approximately
$4.5M.
Code MA (formerly Code ST, the SSF Strategic Plans and Programs Office)
runs the SSF Advanced Development Program. About 75% of that program is
relevant to the topics of this paper, including work in Flight Systems
Automation; Ground Operations Automation; Space Station Information
Systems; and Advanced Automation Software, Hardware, and Human Factors.
Projects are underway at all NASA Centers except SSC, covering prototyping of
applications of advanced technology to all major onboard subsystems
(individual subsystems like power and thermal as well as subsystem
coordination through OMS), ground-based systems like SSCC, and support
systems like TMIS. Total spending in these areas in FY 1990 will be
approximately $8M.
All three programs described above are frequent collaborators, co-
funding certain activities and developing joint plans for technology transfer.
One example of inter-program cooperation is the Real Time Data Systems
(RTDS) series of expert systems applied to MCC at JSC. Early funding was
provided to the Principal Investigator, John Muratore of JSC, by the OAST
Artificial Intelligence Program. He developed the INCO Expert System through
prototyping, flight testing, and routine use for STS missions. Expansion of the
concept to other consoles was funded jointly by OAST and Code MD. Code MA
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has added funding to apply the technologyto the developmentof a Space
Station Control Center(SSCC).
External to NASA, the governmentalprogram of greatest relevance is
that run by the InformationSciencesTechnologyOffice (ISTO) at DARPA. ISTO
has funded basic research and military applications of I A, A OM, and C M since
the late 1960's through a core technology program and the Strategic
Computing Program. Of particular relevance to this paper is the Pilot's
Associate element of Strategic Computing. Total spending of work related to
this paper in FY 1990 is $30M. Through personal contacts and a MOU between
DARPA/ISTO and ARC there is frequent co-funding and joint technology
planning between ISTO and both the OAST Artificial Intelligence Program and
Code MA's Advanced Development Program.
Key Contacts and Facilities
OAST AI Program Mel Montemerlo HQ-RC
Peter Friedland ARC-RIA
MD Advanced Operations Program Chuck Holliman HQ-MD
MA Advanced Development Program Gregg Swietek HQ-MA
ARC Peter Friedland ARC-RIA
Monte Zweben ARC-RIA
Walt Truszkowski GSFC-522.3
JPL David Atkinson JPL-366
Richard Doyle JPL-366
JSC John Muratore JSC-DF
Troy Heindel JSC-DC341
Kathy Healey JSC-EF5
Bob Savely JSC-FM721
KSC Astrid Heard KSC-PT-AST
LeRC Karl Faymon LeRC-5400
MSFC Tom Dollman MSFC-EB44
DARPA/ISTO Steve Cross DARPA/ISTO
Most of the work discussed in this paper takes place in existing Agency
research and development facilities and is tested in existing (and planned
future) operations facilities. A 1990 CofF has recently been approved to start
construction of the Automation Sciences Research Facility at ARC which will
contain office and laboratory space dedicated to advanced automation for all
Agency missions. The most important resources are dedicated groups of
scientists and engineers at a majority of Agency Centers, including world-
class artificial intelligence research laboratories at ARC and JPL, and
experienced artificial intelligence applications groups at GSFC, JSC, KSC, LeRC,
and MSFC.
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Major Issues and Needs
Several technical issues seem particularly important for improving
operational efficiency of future mission control environments at NASA:
The correct mix of humans and machines for decision
support: taking into account costs, reliability, and capabilities
Integration of Artificial Intelligence and advanced
interaction concepts (Hypermedia, Data Gloves, etc.):
mixing AI concepts that allow intelligent assistance with
recently developed information presentation and manipulation
methods
Hardware and software environments for realtime
behavior: developing computing environments that will
allow effective use of advanced automation methods under the
rigors of realtime Agency settings, both ground-based and
onboard
Data storage and reaitime access for very large-scale
corporate memory systems: supporting technology for
information storage and management systems several orders-of-
magnitude larger than those in common use today
Knowledge acqusition and maintenance during long-
term missions: how to make the corporate memory of a major
Agency system (e.g. STS or SSF) a living entity that is continually
updated and improved during a multi-decade lifetime.
It is the author's belief that the existing programs at NASA, primarily in
OAST and Code M as described above, are well-positioned to meet current and
future Space Transportation Systems needs in the areas of advanced mission
control discussed in this paper. Either directly as civil servants or support
service contractors at Agency Centers, or indirectly as grantees or contractors
to those Centers, NASA has perhaps the best human resources in the nation in
the three areas of IA, AOM, and CM. However several non-technical issues,
relating to funding, organizational structures, and the current NASA culture
(or at least how the culture is perceived) may seriously impact the progress of
work in the area. Among those issues are:
How seriously does the Agency really take issues of
life-cycle efficiency: in the initial planning of major
long-term missions (e.g. SSF) there is much talk of the need
to consider life-cycle costs for maintenance, modification,
and utilization. When the inevitable budget cuts arise, all funds
which are not seen as essential for initial mission deployment
are put in grave jeopardy.
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Why is design discrete from operations: current NASA
organizational structures seem to segment system designers
from actual and potential system users. A classic example is
the Hubble Space Telescope. MSFC is responsible for getting it
built, while GSFC is responsible for running it when it is built.
This has led to rivalries as well as duplication of effort in
designing automated operations systems for HST
Why is evolution discrete from operations: current NASA
organizational structures seem to segment those responsible for
current systems operations from those responsible for the "next
generation" of those operations. The JSC Mission Control Center
is one such example where separate directorates are in charge of
ongoing operations and design of the next operations
environment. This, too, has led to rivalries and duplications of
e ffo rt.
Does the current system of exhaustive verification and
validation really lead to safer, more reliable mission
control environments: on the face of it it seems as though
the more testing the better in potentially life and mission critical
settings. However, in information critical environments (which
all missions controls certainly are) it may be better to have more
information sooner, even if some of it is clearly marked
"incompletely verified" as long as human decision-makers are
part of the control loop. Current structures impose huge time
and cost burdens on making simple changes (perhaps based on
results from prior missions) to mission control environments.
Is that always right?
Is the current balance of research, development, and
applications correct: the current NASA environment seems
to place enormous priority on those efforts which can show
direct payback to ongoing missions in the very short term (at
most a year or two). Our culture is to demand a precise schedule
of "deliverables" for such work. For example, it is relatively easy
to "sell" expert systems for ground-based information analysis
and system diagnosis because the technology is "off-the-shelf"
and construction of such systems can meet the same set of
schedules expected for any software product. However, it is far
more difficult to fund or provide precise schedules for longer-
term topics that promise even greater impact on future mission
controls; most of the work in the AOM and CM areas described
in this report falls into that category. We tend to assume
"somebody else" will do the fundamental work necessary to create
new off-the-shelf technologies the way DARPA did for expert
systems over the past twenty years. Is this the best strategy for
an Agency whose devices and missions are among the most
complex ever designed by humans?
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None of the above issues arc simple ones. In all cases the "correct"
solution is most likely somewhere in the middle of two extremes. However, it is
this author's perception that the current Agency culture is too close to one of
the extremes and some changes may be in order. The final section of this
document will make some recommendations.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are those of the author alone, although
they do attempt to encapsulate many discussions before, during, and after the
STATS meeting, particularly with John Muratore, Ray Hartenstein and Michael
See of JSC, Tom Davis and Astrid Heard of KSC, Ann Blackburn of Mitre, and
Ellen Ochoa and Monte Zweben of ARC. Recommendations will be given in
three classes: technical, fiscal, and organizational.
Technical:
1. Continue the blend of technical topics being supported by the OAST, Code
MA, and Code MD programs. Particularly encourage those that span several
disciplines (e.g. artificial intelligence and human factors).
2. Begin a substantial Agency program (most likely in OAST) in the software
engineering of large-scale, realtime systems that encompass both traditional
and advanced automation methods.
3. Use the existing RTDS work at JSC to do a careful study to attempt to quantify
increase in safety, reduction in manpower, and reduction and training time
that will result from judicious use of automation in mission control
environments. Almost all current work in this area is speculative, and an
empirical study on the operational MCC systems would help in future decision-
making.
4. Use SSF TMIS as a case study of CM systems for major Agency missions.
Determine what capabilities will actually be provided and which would have
been available with a 5-10 year research program prior to TMIS initiation.
Fiscal:
I. Ensure stable multi-year funding for scientific and engineering research
and applications prototyping for the areas discussed in this paper. The
funding should be at a fixed, small percent of operational funds (perhaps 5%),
but should not be subject to elimination or serious reduction except on
technical grounds of quality of work. There is no other way to ensure that
life-cycle issues are not the first to be lost under inevitable short-term cost-
cutting pressures.
2. Include careful analyses of life-cycle costs in all contractual selections of
major space transportation subsystems. If the mission is designed to last 30
years, then selection should bc made on total 30-year cost, not on initial cost of
flight.
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Organizational:
1. Do a better job of providing user partnership in design decisions.
Whenever possible include users as part of design teams, SEB's, and the like in
more than just a token fashion. Prototype major systems quickly and get user
feedback from the prototypes instead of relying solely on lengthy, but often
irrelevant, requirements documents.
2. Do a better job of connecting operational and "future-planning"
organizations. Ideally, the latter should be part of the former, not a separate,
often rival, organization. Personnel should flow freely between the two. The
same comments about prototyping vs. requirements documents as discussed
above apply.
3. Respect short, medium and long-term efforts equally within the NASA
organizational culture. If a careful analysis of current missions and
technology reveals a "hole" (such as the CM area) that will take many years of
research to fill, then commit to supporting internal organizations for that
necessary time. Recognize that different schedules and performance metrics
apply to each class of activity.
4. Analyze and consider early testing, in operational environments, of
prototype information management systems before exhaustive verification
and validation. Consider safety and reliability of such systems in a larger
context than simply ensuring against any possible harmful effects of that
system. Particularly consider manual, semi-automatic (with human
intermediaries), and fully automatic methods for providing incremental
improvement in system operations during and between individual missions.
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